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A bio-economic model based upon waterfowl population, habitat, and hunting data in the state of 
Minnesota is used to examine the optimal management strategy of a waterfowl hunting 
enterprise on privately owned land.  Various state sponsored incentive programs are then 
analyzed for their effect on hunting and waterfowl equilibrium levels, as well as the economic 
viability of the hunting enterprise.  A waterfowl habitat and maintenance cost reimbursement 
incentive program is found to be the most effective at inducing additional hunting opportunities 
in Minnesota, while providing economic incentives for private landowners to actively manage 
their land.   
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Optimal Waterfowl Hunting Management Strategies for Private Landowners: 
A Minnesota Case Study 
 
Introduction 
  Waterfowl hunting and conservation efforts in Minnesota have traditionally been very 
successful.  Minnesota ranked number three among duck harvesting states from 1961, when 
federal surveys began, until the early 1990’s.  Since then, however, Minnesota’s rank has 
dropped to number five.  Waterfowl breeding populations in North America expanded 
dramatically in the 1990’s (22 million to 40 million), yet duck harvests and hunter participation 
in Minnesota declined.  Since 1970, Minnesota has seen a decline in waterfowl harvests from 
1.07 million to 680,000, a decline in registered hunters from 161,000 to 120,000, and a decrease 
in the hunter average daily duck bag by 20% (MDNR, 2001).    
  The decline in waterfowl hunting activities in Minnesota is naturally disturbing to 
hunters, conservationists, and government officials alike.   Hunters contribute immensely to local 
economies, creating jobs and providing tax revenues.  In 1996, hunters in the United States spent 
$5.1 billion on travel expenses, $1.4 billion on state taxes, $923 million on hunt leases, $565 
million on hunting licenses, and $155 million on excise taxes (Southwick, 2001).   Not only do 
hunters benefit local economies, but they also contribute to conservation efforts.  The majority of 
hunters feel that the time spent hunting provides a high level of personal satisfaction, or that 
there is an intrinsic value in hunting.  Hence, hunters wish to protect future hunting opportunities 
and ensure that future generations receive the same hunting opportunities they did.  In 1996, 
hunters contributed $296 million in dues and donations to conservation organizations such as 
Ducks Unlimited and Nature Conservancy (Southwick, 2001).    
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  Minnesota natural resource officials contribute declines in hunting activity to the 
degradation of much of Minnesota’s wetlands and other waterfowl habitats.  The Minnesota 
Department of Natural Resources reports that Minnesota has lost more than 52% of its original 
wetlands, with 45 counties reporting a loss of 90%.  Natural waterfowl habitats in Minnesota are 
declining primarily due to reduced food sources and increased disturbance.   
The 1990’s in Minnesota was a period of record precipitation levels.  Many regions of the 
state saw precipitation levels, which exceeded historical averages by as much as 40 inches.  High 
water levels diminished the abundance of shallow lakes, where water depths are less than two 
meters.  Shallow lakes provide waterfowl, especially in the fall, with an abundance of vegetation 
and other important foods, such as wild rice.  Wild rice is very sensitive to water levels.  Many of 
Minnesota’s wild rice beds are actively managed, but many beds have declined over time.  
Increased water levels have also connected previously separated basins, leading to changes in 
fish populations and vegetation.        
As smaller wetland basins decline, waterfowl are forced to concentrate into larger basins, 
which have increased pressure from hunters, shoreline development, and fall fishing activities.  
Lakes, which previously provided security for waterfowl during the hunting season, can now be 
accessed by hunters using off-road and four wheel vehicles, fall fishing has increased 
dramatically in recent years, and recreational shoreline development is also on the rise.  These 
factors contribute to waterfowl disturbance, which can lead to high waterfowl movement into 
basins in other states, which may not provide as much pressure.   
  In an effort to mitigate the decline in hunter activity, the Minnesota Department of 
Natural Resources has proposed a two year project (2001-2003) under the heading “Restoring 
Minnesota’s Wetland and Waterfowl Hunting Heritage”, which has two objectives.  The first is  
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to achieve 1970-79 duck harvest levels and to maintain the harvest distribution of each waterfowl 
species.  The second is to assess and improve Minnesota waterfowl hunter satisfaction measured 
though hunter surveys.  To achieve these two objectives resource officials propose actions to 
increase recruitment of locally reared waterfowl to promote population stability and improve 
waterfowl hunting opportunities.  Stategy 2 of the project states that officials should “Consider a 
program of tax or other incentives to encourage farmers/landowners to allow waterfowl hunting 
on private property”.  Of the Minnesota waterfowl hunters surveyed in 2000, 42.5% hunted 
exclusively on private lands.  Hence, private lands are an important source of hunting 
opportunities in Minnesota.  Crossley and Peterson (2001) maintain that there are large gains in 
efficiency resulting form private wildlife management, as well as improved economic returns to 
private landowners and their local communities.  However, the authors point out that 
overexploitation of the wildlife resource may also result.    
If wildlife officials in Minnesota are going to achieve their objectives though private 
landowner programs, they are going to have to provide enough incentive to private landowners 
to maintain a habitat, which will recruit and sustain locally reared waterfowl and to regulate 
hunting activity, such that waterfowl populations on their land do not overcrowd or crash, both 
of which would lead to diminished breeders over time.  Rich Staffon of the department of natural 
resources testifies that “Landowners with wetlands can protect or improve them, making them 
more attractive to wildlife”.  However, as Crossley and Peterson (2001) point out, participation 
in these programs should be voluntary, where incentives, either financial or in quality of life, are 
high enough to encourage participation.    
In this research we propose an optimal strategy for managing a private hunting enterprise, 
which maximizes the net-present value of the enterprise given three separate incentive programs.    
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The incentive provided to landowners will directly affect the amount of hunters they allow to use 
of their land, the improvements and maintenance of waterfowl habitats on their land, and hence 
the sustainability of the waterfowl population on their land.   For the purposes of this study, we 
will consider the following incentive programs.  The first is a per hunter lease fee, which 
provides a payment to the landowner for each hunter they allow use of their land for hunting 
purposes.  The second is a seasonal lump sum payment, which will offset the opportunity cost 
involved in using the land for hunting purposes.  The third is a direct reimbursement of all land 
management costs for projects which directly improve waterfowl habitats on the land.  A 
separate evaluation of each incentive program will allow us to make policy recommendation for 
the incentive program, which provides the highest possibility of achieving Minnesota’s goals 
concerning waterfowl population stability and increased waterfowl hunting opportunities.   
 
Methodology 
The optimal management of a hunting enterprise is a complicated bio-economic problem 
in which many issues must be considered.  The first of which is how to model such a problem.  
Traditionally, wildlife has been managed under sustainable harvest practices, where wildlife can 
be used for human purposes, but must be regulated in a way such that the annual harvest does not 
exceed the wildlife’s ability to sustain itself at a healthy population level (Southwick, 2001).   
Thus, sustainable harvest practices ensure that private landowners will benefit on a long-term 
basis.  Hence, as with the majority of bio-economic problems, it makes sense to use an optimal 
control framework, in which a feedback rule adjusts harvest rates at each time interval in 
response to the present ecological situation.  The problem confronting the private landowner is 
one of finding the maximum return from a given parcel of land. This problem is formulated as an  
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infinite horizon optimal control problem where the landowner must adjust the harvest (number of 
hunters) each period in order to maximize the net present value of the resource (the waterfowl 
population).  While the model focuses upon optimal management of a single unit of land it 
allows for the possibility of population influx from neighboring parcels.  Hence, the essence of 
the landowner's problem is one of optimally managing the extraction of a renewable resource 
whose renewal rate is determined both by the natural birth and mortality rate of the current 
population as well as recruitment from outside populations. 
As Johnson (2000) points out, there is still uncertainty regarding the impact of harvesting 
on waterfowl populations.   Previous literature on waterfowl dynamics hypothesizes that 
waterfowl populations may be more affected by reproductive effectiveness than by waterfowl 
survivorship.  However, a lack of data and incomplete biological info has been a main factor in 
inhibiting research gains in this area.  Cohen (1986) attempted to measure the compensatory 
relationship between natural mortality and harvest mortality in Mallard ducks.  Cohen found 
there to be a compensatory relationship for male Mallards, but the findings for female Mallards 
were inconclusive.  If a compensatory relationship does indeed exist, a higher degree of 
waterfowl may be harvested without reducing population levels.  Nichols (2000) attributes the 
issues in measuring harvest impact on waterfowl populations to partial observability and partial 
controllability.  He states that state variables such as waterfowl population are not known, but 
must be estimated, and control variables such as harvesting or hunting cannot be imposed 
directly, but must be applied indirectly through hunting regulations.  However, as may be 
evident, the private landowner can measure waterfowl populations on his/her land quite 
accurately, and additionally has the ability to control harvesting on a per hunter basis.  As is  
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described later in more detail, a direct statistical relationship between harvesting and waterfowl 
populations was found based on Minnesota data.   
 
Model Formulation 
The goal of this section is to explore the variations in long-run sustainable hunting and 
waterfowl population rates resulting from different biological and economic conditions.     
The general formulation of the landowner problem is as follows: 
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  Essentially, the return to private landowners from allocating a parcel of land to waterfowl 
production is the hunting fee collected.  Thus, the decision is one of maximizing the net present 
value of hunting fees via the choice of optimal hunting rates each period.  In deciding upon an 
optimal strategy, the landowner must account for two important factors.  The first is how hunting 
in one period will affect future waterfowl populations.  The second is how the willingness of 
hunters to pay for access is affected by the number of hunters using the land. 
The effect of hunting rates on the waterfowl population is represented by (2).  The first 
part of this expression captures the relationship between population growth rate and the land's 
carrying capacity.  Carrying capacity,
b
2P a , is expressed as a function of the number of available 
ponds.  This functional form is adopted directly from the form first developed by Brown et. all 
(1976) and estimated by Beaverton and Holt.  It reflects the absolute population limit on a parcel 
of land given a fixed number of ponds.  This value is increasing in both the number of available 
ponds, P, as well as the suitability of those ponds for waterfowl. 
It is assumed the waterfowl population will increase at a steady rate, r.  This intrinsic 
growth rate incorporates both the natural birth and mortality rates of waterfowl as well as new 
recruitment to the parcel of land.  New recruitment refers to waterfowl nesting on a parcel of 
land, whom were neither born on the land nor nested on the land in a previous season.  For low 
population levels, the growth rate of the population from both reproduction and recruitment is 
low.  Similarly, as the population approaches the land's carrying capacity, the population growth 
rate decreases until it reaches zero at carrying capacity.  This natural population dynamic is 
directly affected by hunting, H.  For simplicity, it is assumed that all hunters fill their bags so the 
harvest rate is equal to the number of hunters and the harvest rate is set to one.   
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The tradeoff between the number of hunters and the fee hunters are willing to pay is 






















1 P a   H P .   Similar to the way in which carrying capacity 
depends upon both the number of ponds as well as the suitability of those ponds for waterfowl 
habitat, the basic access fee a landowner is able to charge is dependant upon the quality of the 
waterfowl habitat, 
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As stated in the report, “The 2000 Waterfowl Hunting Season in Minnesota: A Study of 
Hunters’ Opinions and Activities,” the value placed upon hunting has as much to do with the 














1 .  As the number of hunters on a given parcel of land increases, the quality of 
the hunting experience and, consequently, the hunters' willingness to pay for that experience 
decreases.  It is assumed this value goes to zero as the number of hunters using the parcel of land 
approaches its capacity.  It should be noted that little research exists on what is a parcel of land's 
"hunting capacity".  However, the use of a dimensionless model alleviates this problem by 
focusing on the rate and not actual capacity.   
The original objective function of the landowner is reduced to a dimensionless problem, 
which arrives at an optimal hunting and waterfowl population rates rather than actual hunter and 
population numbers. This simplification is done for two important reasons.  The first is 
interpretability.  Much of the data concerning waterfowl populations and hunting management 
exists on various scales of measure, thus reducing the problem to one of percentages of total 
capacity, rather than one of absolute value, leads to results with direct bio-economic 
interpretations.  The second reason is tractability.  As is discussed in the following section, the  
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job of gathering and properly analyzing waterfowl populations and hunting data is extremely 
problematic.  Where data does exist, it is often subject to wide variation and measurement error.  
The development of a dimensionless problem allows for comparisons between different 
incentive programs, as well as populations and habitats. 
The number of total parameters in the system can be reduced to a smaller set of 
dimensionless parameters by the following dimensionless variables into (1). 
 td = t
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Many of these new dimensionless variables have intuitive bio-economic interpretations.  For 
instance,  t h  is simply the percentage of total hunting capacity used at time t, and  t d is the 
percentage of the waterfowl carrying capacity. 
Solving these new variables for existing variables and substituting into the objective 
function yields the following dimensionless objective function: 
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  Similarly, substituting the dimensionless variables into the equation of motion and 
solving for the change in the population rate with respect to the scaled rate of return, t, arrives at 
  ( ) t 2 t t 1 h ? d 1 d  ? =   d - - &                 (6) 
where the dimensionless parameters of s1, g1, and g2 represent the maximum hunting fee, the 
intrinsic growth rate of the waterfowl population and the ratio of the land’s maximum waterfowl 
population to the parcel’s maximum number of hunters.  Each of these parameters is scaled by  
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the real annual discount rate, which reflects the annual rate of return from the next best 
alternative use of the parcel of land. 
Conditions for a Maximum 
The problem of the private landowner now amounts to one of selecting hunting rates in a 
manner that maximizes the return from the parcel of land, or maximizing the dimensionless 
objective function, (5), subject to the dimensionless equation of motion, (6).  Omitting hunting 
capacity, H K , and forming the Hamiltonian leads to: 
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The necessary conditions for maximizing returns are as follows: 
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  Using the conditions of (8) along with (6) allows for the derivation of equations of 
motion for hunting rates,h & , waterfowl populations,d & , and the shadow value of future hunting 
revenues, ? & . The specific forms of these equations are: 
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  The set of equations expressed in (9) allows for phase diagram analysis in either state-
costate (d, l) or state-control (h,d) space.  Because the goal of this project is the analysis of 
optimal hunting strategies and their relation to sustainable waterfowl populations, focus will be 
paid to state-control space or the (h,d) phase plane.  Solving (9a) and (9c) for the zero-change 
nullclines yields: 
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The dynamics of the system are expressed by: 
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The nullclines (10) and dynamics (11) of the system imply a stable, saddle point equilibrium. 
 
Model Calibration 
  Although the major interest of this study is the effect of the purposed incentive programs 
upon private management decisions in order to properly model these decisions, it is first 
necessary to gain an improved understanding of how mitigating factors such as habitat variation 
and behavioral characteristics affect breeding population levels. 
To quantify these effects, a regression analysis was conducted.  The results of that 
analysis are presented in the following section.  However, prior to the presentation of the results, 
a brief discussion regarding the purpose and goals of this secondary analysis is required.  The 
goals of the secondary analysis are twofold.  First, the analysis seeks to empirically investigate 
what adjustments to the theoretical model are needed in order to account for differences in 
waterfowl species and/or habitat areas.  Second, an estimate of the level of habitat disturbance 
caused by hunting activity is needed.  Consequently, the following analysis attempts to estimate 
how the level of hunting activity within a given year affects breeding population levels the 
following year
2.   
                                                 
2 The parameter is especially of interest given concerns regarding the decrease of breeding numbers within 
Minnesota.  
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Data Overview 
Data for the years 1990- 2001 was gathered from three main sources.  Waterfowl 
breeding population data are from the Wetland Wildlife Populations and Research Group
3.  
Harvest data are from the annual hunter survey of the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service and climate 
data were gathered from the Western Regional Climate Center.  Summary statistics of the 
variables appearing in the final model are supplied in Table 1. 
According to the 2001 Waterfowl Breeding Population Survey, waterfowl habitats within 
the state of Minnesota are assigned to one of three strata.  Each stratum is defined by lake basin 
(=10 acres) density.  Definitions of the three strata are as follows: 
•  Stratum I:  High Density, 21 or more basins per township 
•  Stratum II: Moderate Density, 11-20 basins per township 
•  Stratum III: Low Density, 2 to 10 basins per township 
In a similar way, the State of Minnesota assigns each waterfowl species a type according 
to the major behavior patterns of that species.  For instance, the waterfowl type dabblers, refers 
to species whose eating habits are classified as dabbling on the water surface versus diving for 
food, or divers.  Table 2 contains a list of waterfowl species in which breeding data is available 
along with the type classification of each species. 
  Harvest data were supplied by the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service (USFWS) Harvest 
Surveys Section's annual mail questionnaire sent to registered hunters.  Survey results are 
compiled on a county by county basis with the responses from any given county weighted in 
order to correspond to historical trends and known hunter activity within that county.  In order to 
properly match waterfowl harvest numbers with the breeding population data supplied by the 
                                                 
3 A section of the Minnesota Department of Natural Resources  
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Waterfowl Population Breeding Survey, hunter survey respondents were re-compiled by strata 
and waterfowl type. 
  Monthly climate data (precipitation and temperature) by county were collected for the 
years of interest as well as for several preceding years.  Once collected, yearly averages, year-to-
date amounts, and 10 year monthly moving averages were calculated for each county.  These 
results were then used to compute a weighted average for each habitat strata.  Each county's 
weight for a given strata was determined by the percentage of a strata's habitat existing within 
that county.  Year-to-date and 10 year moving averages were not found significant predictors in 
preliminary analysis and were subsequently dropped from further model specifications.   
Estimated Results 
  A variety of fixed effects model specifications were fit with dummy variables used to 
identify strata and waterfowl type.  For all models considers, Prior Year Harvest (LaggedHa), 
Average Precipitation (Precip), and Temperature (Temp) were also included.  Other possible 
predictors including interaction terms and polynomials were included or excluded according to 
their predictive power in order to arrive at a final model.  For clarity, the general form of the 
regression equation used to arrive at the final model was as follows: 
  Population = ao + a1(Strata1) + a2(Strata2) + a3(Dabbler) + a3(Diver)     (12) 
+ b1(Prior Year Harvest) + b2(Precip) + b3(Temp)  




The final model selected as a result of this process was the following: 
  Population = 2242273 - 0.335 LaggedHarvest - 2251 Precip - 98937 Temp   (13) 
  - 44253 Strata1 - 16198 Strata2 + 69525 Dabbler - 17484 Diver 
  + 1160 Temp2 
 
Residual analysis of the OLS estimation of (12) indicated the assumptions of normality 
and constant variance appeared to hold.  This was further supported by appropriate tests.   
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However, the possibility of an outlier was also found.  Further investigation indicated this outlier 
was most likely the result of a data entry error and could be dropped.  However, to protect 
against a selection bias, the final model, (12) was re-estimated two different ways.  First, the 
suspect data point was dropped and the model estimated using OLS.  Second, the model was re-
estimated using Iteratively Re-weighted Least Squares (IRLS) where the weights were 
determined by squaring the residuals from the auxiliary regression: 
    v  Xß   e       ˆ + =                 (14) 
Results from both the IRLS estimation as well as the OLS estimation excluding outliers are 




  A base set of dimensional parameter values was used to determine the dimensionless 
parameter values, which were then inserted into the theoretical model to determine equilibrium 
levels of hunting, waterfowl population, and the current shadow value of future hunting revenues 
for the private landowner (Table 4). 
  The values for a2 and b were provided by previous mallard studies (Brown et. all, 1976),  
the discount rate, delta, was determined based on current market returns, and the waterfowl 
growth rate, r, was estimated based on Minnesota waterfowl breeding and population data for 
both dabbler and diver waterfowl types.   It should be pointed out that waterfowl growth rates for 
each type vary widely across years, and the diver type tends to have a much stronger growth rate 
than the dabbler type.  Hence, it is important for the landowner to investigate the type of 
waterfowl breeders on the land parcel and use a growth rate, which is appropriate to its specific  
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waterfowl population.  The breeding habitats or ponds per parcel of land, was estimated based on 
the Minnesota stratum data previously described.  A basic a1 value was assigned equal to that of 
a2, as an initial lease value based on the waterfowl carrying capacity of the land parcel.    
  The base problem identified an equilibrium hunting rate of 22.9% of the total hunting 
capacity, in which a maximum of 50% of the current waterfowl population could be harvested.  
Additionally, the current shadow value of future hunting revenues was 11 (Table 4).  As seen in 
Figure 1, the private landowner may adjust the hunting rate per the present state of the waterfowl 
population.  For example, should the current waterfowl population be at 75% of capacity, the 
private landowner should allow hunting at approximately 35% of the hunting capacity to put the 
system on a stable manifold, which will guide the system towards equilibrium levels.   If the 
current waterfowl population was at 40%, the private landowner should allow hunting at 
approximately 10% of total hunting capacity.   
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The next step of our analysis is to perturb the base parameter values to mimic our three 
state sponsored incentive programs.    
Per-hunter Lease Fee 
The first incentive program is the per-hunter lease fee, which may take the form of a tax 
credit or other payment to the private landowner for each hunter allowed use of the land.  This 
program directly impacts the revenue function of the landowner.  In order to measure the impact 
of this type of incentive program, we must increase the a1 parameter value in the model.  For this 
purpose we have chosen to increase a1 from its base value of 4.88 to 19.88, by increasing the 
value of the land quality by 15.  Essentially, this incentive programs provides the private land 
owner with an additional fee above what the hunter may be willing to pay.  It also provides an 
incentive for the landowner to allow hunting or additional hunting, which increases hunting 
opportunities without incurring added expenses.          
  The adjustment to the a1 parameter did not change the equilibrium level of hunting or the 
annual harvest rate, but it substantially increased the shadow value of future hunting revenues 
from 11 to 48 (Table 5).   
Seasonal Lump Sum Payment 
  The second incentive program is the seasonal lump sum payment, which could take the 
form of a property tax or other tax rebate paid to the private landowner each hunting season, with 
a requirement that the landowner allow hunters to use the land.  The lump sum payment 
essentially lowers the discount rate, or the opportunity cost involved in using the land for hunting 
purposes.  In order to measure the impact of this type of incentive program, we decrease the 
discount rate from its base level of 8% to 2%.  The adjustment to the discount parameter did not  
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change the equilibrium level of hunting or the annual harvest rate, but it substantially decreased 
the shadow value of future hunting revenues from 11 to 2.9 (Table 6).   
Cost Reimbursement  
  The third and final incentive program is the cost reimbursement program, which 
effectively reimburses the private landowner for expenses incurred in improving and maintaining 
the waterfowl habitats on the land.  In order to measure the impact of this type of incentive 
program, we must increase the b parameter in our model to show an increase in the effectiveness 
of the waterfowl habitats at attracting and maintaining breeding pairs.   We have elected to 
increase this parameter by 10%, which effectively changes b from .791 to .891.  The benefits of 
the program would, in fact, only be realized should the private landowner incur land 
management costs relating to waterfowl habitats.        
The adjustment to the b parameter increased both the equilibrium value of the percentage 
of hunting capacity used from 22.9% to 30.9%, and the current shadow value of future hunting 
revenues from 11 to 15.  The equilibrium value for total allowable harvest of 50%, however, did 
not change (Table 7).   Thus, this incentive program will induce a higher level of hunting across 
time as well as increase the value of the hunting enterprise for the private landowner.   
 
Conclusion 
In this study we have provided a baseline bio-economic model, which can be used by 
private landowners to maximize the net present value of their fee-hunting enterprise, while 
actively managing their waterfowl populations so as not to induce crashes or overcrowding.  
Each of the three incentive programs provided a different picture of the overall hunting activity, 
waterfowl population levels, and present value hunting revenues.  The cost reimbursement  
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incentive program, however, was the most successful at promoting the goals of Minnesota’s 
waterfowl hunting heritage restoration project.  The cost reimbursement plan encourages 
landowners to improve and maintain their waterfowl habits, which leads to increased recruitment 
of locally reared waterfowl and eventually to waterfowl population stability.  Additionally, this 
incentive program increased hunting opportunities from 22.9% of total hunting capacity to 30% 
of total hunting capacity, while maintaining a stable population harvest at 50%.   The second best 
incentive program was found to be the per-hunter lease fee, which improved the present value of 
future revenues for the private landowner, but did not increase hunting activities or encourage 
waterfowl habitat maintenance.   
Of course the specifics of the cost reimbursement incentive program need additional 
refinement.  The program must induce private landowners to participate in the program and 
provide enough incentive for them to effectively manage their fee hunting enterprise.  In other 
words, the program must align the incentives of both the private landowner and Minnesota 
Wildlife programs.  This refinement is an agency theory type of problem and is the focus of our 
ongoing research. 
In closing, it is important to note one of the most curious finding of this research, is the 
insensitivity of equilibrium waterfowl population levels to the incentive programs that were 
explored.   This is likely due to the ease at which the private landowner is able to maintain 
his/her waterfowl population via recruitment.  As a result, the landowner is not overly concerned 
with the sustainability of his/her initial population as long as any harvesting of that population 
can easily be replaced by recruitment from other populations.    
 
.    
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Appendix 
Table 1: Summary Statistics of Variables 
Variable  N  Mean  Med  SD  Min  Max  Q1  Q3 
Breeding 
Population  81  50293  33493  46543  7714  217490  16852  65485 
Prior Year Harvest  81  61851  50780  43795  4876  190639  31722  82938 
Average Monthly 
Precipitation  81  28.702  28.444  2.45  24.044  34.356  27.045  30.879 
Average Temp  81  42.2  42.569  2.355  37.054  46.67  40.563  43.4 
 
Table 2: Species and Type Classification 
Species  Waterfowl Type  Species  Waterfowl Type 
Mallard  Dabbler  Redhead  Diver 
Black Duck  Dabbler  Canvasback  Diver 
Gadwall  Dabbler  Scaup  Diver 
American Wigeon  Dabbler  Ring-necked Duck  Diver 
Green-winged Teal  Dabbler  Goldeneye  Diver 
Blue-winged Teal  Dabbler  Bufflehead  Diver 
Northern Shoveler  Dabbler  Ruddy Duck  Diver 
Northern  Pintail  Dabbler  Hooded Merganser  Diver 
Wood Duck  Dabbler  Large Merganser  Diver 
Coot  Other     
Canada Goose  Other     
 
Table 3: Results from Corrected Models 
Predictor  Coef  SE  T  P   
OLS Estimation Excluding Outlying Data Point 
Constant  921806  1473654  0.63  0.5359   
LaggedHa  -0.30741  0.11277  -2.73  0.0102   
Precip  -1.34432  1380.692  0  0.9992   
Temp  -39850  68455  -0.58  0.5644   
Strata1  -51082  10351  -4.93  <.0001   
Strata2  -29983  8223.856  -3.65  0.0009   
Dabbler  83249  10401  8  <.0001   
Diver  -17126  7725.614  -2.22  0.0336   
Temp2  466.19944  796.3027  0.59  0.5622   
S  0.0000129  R-Sq  85.49%  R-Sq  81.97% 
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Iteratively Re-weighted Least Squares Estimates   
Constant  778719  587334  1.33  0.189   
LaggedHa  -0.3265  0.08313  -3.93  <.0001   
Precip  -1916  861.1  -2.22  0.029   
Temp  -32099  27679  -1.16  0.25   
Strata1  -41779  5752  -7.26  <.0001   
Strata2  -14390  7437  -1.93  0.057   
Dabbler  77385  6410  12.07  <.0001   
Diver  -9134  4999  -1.83  0.072   
Temp2  388.8  325.7  1.19  0.237   
S  17852  R-Sq  83.90%  R-Sq(adj)  82.10% 
 
Table 4: Initial Parameter Conditions 
Dimensional Parameters 
   Base  Incentive  Total 
a1  4.88 0 4.88
a2  4.88 0 4.88
B  0.791 0 0.791
Ponds  20 0 20
Delta (discount rate)  0.08 0 0.08
Waterfowl Growth Rate{r}  0.3516 0 0.3516
Hunter Capacity {Kh}    20
T      1
a1*p^b (Price Parameter)        52.18366152
a2*p^b (Waterfowl Capacity)     52.18366152
ht (Hunting rate-used for Revenue Function example)  0.229347192
Dimensionless Parameters 
S1        104.367323
G1        4.395
G2        4.790771531
Tau        0.08
Equilibrium d        0.5
Equilibrium h      0.229347192
Equilibrium ?        11.7923841
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Table 5: Per-hunter Lease Fee Conditions 
Dimensional Parameters 
   Base  Incentive  Total 
a1  4.88 15 19.88
a2  4.88 0 4.88
B  0.791 0 0.791
Ponds  20 0 20
Delta (discount rate)  0.08 0 0.08
Waterfowl Growth Rate{r}  0.3516 0 0.3516
Hunter Capacity {Kh}    20
T      1
a1*p^b (Price Parameter)        212.5842605
a2*p^b (Waterfowl Capacity)     52.18366152
ht (Hunting rate-used for Revenue Function example)  0.229347192
Dimensionless Parameters 
S1        425.1685209
G1        4.395
G2        4.790771531
Tau        0.08
Equilibrium d        0.5
Equilibrium h      0.229347192
Equilibrium Lambda        48.03946636
 
Table 6: Seasonal Lump Sum Payment Conditions 
Dimensional Parameters 
   Base  Incentive  Total 
a1  4.88 0 4.88
a2  4.88 0 4.88
B  0.791 0 0.791
Ponds  20 0 20
Delta (discount rate)  0.08 -0.06 0.02
Waterfowl Growth Rate{r}  0.3516 0 0.3516
Hunter Capacity {Kh}    20
T      1
a1*p^b (Price Parameter)        52.18366152
a2*p^b (Waterfowl Capacity)     52.18366152
ht (Hunting rate-used for Revenue Function example)  0.229347192
Dimensionless Parameters 
S1        104.367323
G1        17.58
G2        19.16308612
Tau        0.02
Equilibrium d        0.5
Equilibrium h      0.229347192
Equilibrium Lambda        2.948096024
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Table 7: Cost Reimbursement Conditions 
Dimensional Parameters 
   Base  Incentive  Total 
a1  4.88 0 4.88
a2  4.88 0 4.88
b  0.791 0.1 0.891
Ponds  20 0 20
Delta (discount rate)  0.08 0 0.08
Waterfowl Growth Rate{r}  0.3516 0 0.3516
Hunter Capacity {Kh}    20
t      1
a1*p^b (Price Parameter)        70.41051942
a2*p^b (Waterfowl Capacity)     70.41051942
ht (Hunting rate-used for Revenue Function example)  0.309454233
Dimensionless Parameters 
S1        140.8210388
G1        4.395
G2        3.550605819
tau        0.08
Equilibrium d        0.5
Equilibrium h      0.309454233
Equilibrium Lambda        15.11452087
 
 